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Between Cabbages and Kings: Speaking Across Forms of Life 
Marcus Morgan, Cambridge University 
 
I would like to thank Leandro Rodriguez Medina for his generous and unexpected 
comments1 on my article.2 It’s always a privilege to have someone read one’s work 
carefully, and his review has served the added welcome end of drawing my attention 
to the Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective. I am happy to learn that this 
initiative itself embodies a feature of knowledge production I tried to highlight in my 
article: its perennially evolving nature as a conversation amongst a community of 
enquirers. 
 
Imagination and Social Science 
 
In order to avoid the risk of agreeing too much, the majority of my response here will 
focus upon Rodriguez Medina’s more critical comments, mainly in relation to the 
canon, and the possibility of dialogue across potentially incommensurable “forms of 
life.” First, however, a brief note of strong agreement. 
 
Rodriguez Medina raises the centrality of “imagination” to quality social science. 
With this, I really couldn’t agree more. I am proud to practise a discipline whose 
unofficial manifesto to potential new recruits is so often Mills’s classic The 
Sociological Imagination.3 Mills chose the title for his book carefully, and expressed 
his unease with the term “social science,” since, as he wrote, “the word ‘science’ has 
acquired great prestige and rather imprecise meaning” and he did not feel “any need 
to kidnap the prestige or to make the meaning even less precise by using it as a 
philosophical metaphor.”4 Foregrounding the importance of imagination is not merely 
useful as a proselytising tool, it also allows for a reflexive awareness of the 
subjectivity that inevitably goes into creating sociological knowledge, combined with 
a recognition that such knowledge is none the poorer for that fact.  
 
The creative impulse that drove the founding of institutionalised sociology in the 
nineteenth century no doubt derived from its dream of science. However, to maintain 
its scientific credentials these days, we must either expand the notion of science 
beyond the capacity for language to maintain a usefully stable connotative function 
(the looser German term “Wissenschaft” might pose fewer problems), or else commit 
ourselves to the uneasy claim that the majority of activity carried out under the banner 
of sociology is in fact not really sociology at all. To insist upon their inherent 
connection, it seems that one of the terms—“science” or “sociology”—has to give. 
 
In many ways this debate has in fact long been settled, and I doubt any social scientist 
(even an economist) would nowadays feel comfortable locating him or herself in the 
unlikely image that Hobbes painted in the Leviathan, wherein the social sciences were 
to constitute a sub-branch of physics. This is not to say that the natural sciences do not 
provide a potentially useful model for disciplines like sociology, for certain ends they 
surely do and to deny the central role of systematic empiricism within the social 
sciences would be foolish. However, social scientific knowledge can in no simplistic 
																																																						
1 Rodriguez Medina 2016. 
2 Morgan 2016a. 
3 C. Wright Mills 1959.  
4 Ibid., 18n2. 
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way be understood as determined by empiricism. All sorts of non-empirical and a 
priori inputs go into shaping empirical perceptions of the world, and there can be no 
theory-independent observational language with which to describe that world. 
Empiricism usually involves “seeing as” rather than simply “seeing that,”5 and this 
holds true for the natural sciences too, even if under conditions of normal science 
such non-empirical inputs are typically well concealed by their taken-for-granted 
nature.  
 
The model provided by natural science has also been revealed by historians, 
ethnographers, and philosophers of science not to be the singular unified approach 
that it was once presumed to be, and nor is it the only model on offer. Such things as 
literature, history, social activism, art, linguistics, even punk6 have all proven their 
utility as inspirations for studying society effectively and imaginatively. Much of my 
defence of sociology as a specifically humanistic discipline elsewhere7 is intended to 
reassert its debts to, and resonances with, the collection of disciplines usually grouped 
together under “the humanities,” as much as its connections with the empirical 
sciences. 
 
Rodriguez Medina suggests that acknowledging that notions of knowledge 
verification need to be situated in “forms of life” implies the need for reform in 
sociological education: “the very idea of the canon, which still informs many, if not 
all, textbooks in the disciplines tends to overestimate some forms of life at the 
expense of others.”8 This is certainly true, though as long as we insist on certain 
conditions of knowledge production, I’m not sure I see the continuing presence of a 
canon as necessarily pernicious. This is firstly for fairly mundane and functional 
reasons, such as the practical purposes that a canon serves in providing an historical 
anchor and organising discourse in an otherwise relatively amorphous and 
intellectually promiscuous discipline. Sociology is a broad and internally-dissenting 
church indeed, but its admirable openness is won at the risk of a potential loss of 
intellectual coherence. 
 
Being able to refer to Durkheim or Simmel, or figures who are slowly being pushed 
from the margins to the centre of the canon such as Du Bois or Martineau, allows for 
the otherwise highly unlikely feat that a sociologist researching the effects of 
economic liberalisation on homelessness might engage in a meaningful sociological 
conversation with one researching the social life of test-tubes. Paradoxically, limiting 
the number of books or authors we take as sacred can encourage a greater degree of 
open engagement across the discipline and provoke encounters that otherwise might 
not occur. The fewer the number of canonical bridges linking the various research 
sites, the more likely meetings are to take place on such crossings. These encounters, 
and the conversations that spring from them, may themselves form the basis for canon 
reform.  
 
Beyond these functional purposes of the canon, there are also normally good, albeit 
debatable, inherent reasons why certain works become sacralised. Such works 
typically contain a higher-than-usual degree of intrinsic intellectual merit, if one is 
																																																						
5 Norwood Russell Hanson 1958. 
6 David Beer 2014. 
7 Morgan 2016b, Ch. 4. 
8 Rodriguez Medina 2016, op. cit., 68. 
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able to talk of such a thing in a sociology of knowledge context. How to identify and 
measure this merit is of course contentious territory. One potential identifier is that 
really good books (the few that deserve to be considered for canonical status) are 
almost always productive grist for the hermeneutic mill, and classics ought only justly 
become such if they are capable of sparking original and useful re-readings and 
reinterpretations in the present. The best texts seem to share this capacity for 
provoking fresh ideas in each new generation of readers. Once they cease to do this 
(unless they are to continue to serve as what Kuhn calls “exemplars”), I agree that 
they should indeed make way for others. 
 
This is not to say that the insularity of a canon and barriers to access are not dangers, 
nor to deny—as the recent movements around ‘decolonising education’ have made 
clear—that questions about the content of the canon are always political questions 
too, and especially so since they hold effects on how neophytes are to be socialised 
and therefore how the discipline is likely to reproduce itself. The insistence on 
“certain conditions of knowledge production” that I referred to above must certainly 
include mechanisms for open contestability in terms of which works are to be 
included and, when the time is right, excluded from the canon. This is a matter on 
which bright, well-read, and often politicised students are frequently one step ahead 
of overworked faculty, who are themselves invested in avoiding the extra labour that 
inevitably comes with periodically revising curricula. 
 
On Indigenous Knowledge 
 
Quoting from Harding’s new book,9 Rodriguez Medina raises the question of 
“indigenous knowledge,” and what I understand to be the issue of the demand for 
reincorporating the excluded and the peripheral, and questioning the universality of 
the conceptual apparatus developed in the core. In terms of sociology, not only was 
much of the classical canon constituted in reference to the oriental or colonial 
“other,”10 but so too was the very conception of modernity that it took as its primary 
object of study.11 I am therefore in agreement that “other” ways of knowing 
(historically, as well as culturally) ought to be put in conversation with “our own” 
accounts of knowledge, and the humanities and social sciences seem to me to have led 
the way in achieving this. Another interesting and related question is how European 
and North American thought has been transformed in the process of its reception in 
other areas of the world, a field Rodriguez Medina has himself contributed to,12 and 
which I am currently exploring through the case of Black Consciousness in South 
Africa.  
 
However, it should also be remembered that attacks on the idea of the sociological 
canon have not only come from those at work in upsetting claims to epistemic 
universality and pushing for a reconsideration of the place of the marginal within the 
centre. Critique of the value of a sociological canon has also come from the centre 
itself, in the form of sociologists concerned with defending a more strictly scientific 
conception of the discipline. This was especially so in post-war America, when it was 
suggested that the history of social thought must not get muddled up with the primary 
																																																						
9 Sandra Harding 2015. 
10 Craig Calhoun 1996. 
11 Gurminder Bhambra 2007. 
12 Rodriguez Medina 2014. 
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task of building a unified systemic body of sociological theory. Past sociological 
insight, in this critique, was relevant to present research concerns only to the extent 
that its claims had been empirically verified, and so could be incorporated into 
contemporary social models. “After all,” wrote Merton, “schools of medicine do not 
confuse the history of medicine with current medical practice, nor do departments of 
biology identify the history of biology with the viable theory now employed in 
guiding and interpreting biological research.”13 Merton’s choice of analogues is 
telling, and it should hopefully be clear that my own views diverge from these, and 
again, mainly because I see characteristics usually associated with the humanities—
and in particular the claim that there is never simply a single use for knowledge and 
therefore never a single way of judging it—as central to sociological knowledge 
development. 
 
On a slightly different issue, but again taking his impulse from Harding, Rodriguez 
Medina writes that 
 
Perhaps one of the few shortcomings of Morgan’s text is a lack of 
reflection about the possible dialogue between forms of life, between 
different “truths”, between epistemic communities whose knowledge 
has actually affected their way of relating to the world… he does not 
seem to be sensitive to situations, in practical everyday life, in which 
those who use “truth” in one way have to communicate with those who 
use it in a different—or contradictory—way.14 
 
This issue of communicating across different forms of life comes to the fore most 
prominently with the intensification of globalisation processes, and it takes on 
normative stakes since value judgements infuse epistemic communities and often 
define their borders. In addition, epistemic communities hardly ever possess explicit 
and formally developed propositional accounts of the particular theory of “truth” they 
subscribe to. For both of these reasons, the debate around the philosophy of the social 
sciences is pushed towards a debate around ethnocentrism (and on a more speculative 
reading, anthropocentrism too). This is also an area where my own views depart 
radically from the complacent ethnocentrism (or “anti-anti-ethnocentrism”) of 
Rorty.15  
 
On this matter I think Geertz was right—in both an epistemological and a moral 
sense—to warn against “the attractions of ‘deafness to the appeal of other values’ and 
of a relax-and-enjoy-it approach to one’s imprisonment in one’s own cultural 
tradition.”16 He was also correct in drawing our attention to the problematic 
assumption of consensus within communities. As he put it, “foreignness does not start 
at the water’s edge, but at the skin’s,”17 and although Geertz grants Wittgenstein the 
benefit of the doubt, it was in part on this point—about the internal coherence, 
isolation, and stability of communities—on which Gellner famously took issue with 
Wittgenstein and his devotees.18 
																																																						
13 Robert K. Merton 1949, 4. 
14 Rodriguez Medina 2016, op. cit., 69. 
15 Richard Rorty 1991, 203-210. 
16 Clifford Geertz 1986, 257. 
17 Geertz 1986, op. cit., 261. 
18 Ernest Gellner 1959. 
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In this way, Geertz’s, as opposed to Rorty’s interpretation of “forms of life” seems far 
more adequate to me (whether or not it is in fact a more accurate reflection of what 
Wittgenstein himself actually meant). Rather than taking the notion that thought and 
judgement are located in a form of life as meaning that “the limits of my world are the 
limits of my language,” Geertz instead reminds us that what Wittgenstein in fact said 
was that, 
 
the limits of my language are the limits of my world, which implies 
not that the reach of our minds, of what we say, think, appreciate, and 
judge, is trapped within the borders of our society, our country, our 
class, or our time, but that the reach of our minds, the range of signs 
we can manage somehow to interpret, is what defines the intellectual, 
emotional, and moral space within which we live.19 
 
On this reading, ground is cleared not only for communication, but also for learning, 
and indeed doing so from forms of knowledge we might impulsively find absurd or 
repugnant. Rather than recoiling from such knowledge, what Gadamer termed a 
“fusion of horizons” is instead placed back on the agenda. Cultural diversity, 
including alternative notions of “truth,” is understood in Bernard Williams’s phrase as 
providing not merely “alternatives to us,” but also potential “alternatives for us.”20 
Even where communities are not imbricated, they are seen as at least having windows 
in Geertz’s vision, and humans are understood as capable of translation, 
interpretation, and of “defining the terrain reason must cross if its modest rewards are 
to be reached and realised.”21 
 
Conclusion 
 
Whilst not wishing to abandon the term, Harding’s new book draws out the irony and 
confusion that stems from the fact that appeals to the epistemic norm of “objectivity” 
so often lack the thing they claim themselves to have. Values, she stresses, are at the 
centre of most of what we do, in science as elsewhere, and there is no ultimate way of 
surgically excising them from our activity. In many ways her appeal to the notion of 
“strong objectivity” from below is in fact congruent with two arguments I have 
supported elsewhere.  
 
These are, firstly, that the kinds of truths generated by the social sciences tend to 
exhibit characteristics of what James Clifford called “partial truths,”22 in the sense of 
being both committed and incomplete.23 This partiality—again in both senses of the 
term—derives from our simultaneously limited and privileged location within the 
world, as well as our interests, which in the process of developing more adequate 
research methodologies Harding and others have called a “standpoint.”  
 
Secondly, that the production of social knowledge ought never be separated from the 
development of grounded forms of social hope, aimed ultimately towards the 
																																																						
19 Geertz 1986, op. cit., 263. 
20 Geertz 1986, op. cit., 260. 
21 Geertz 1986, op. cit., 270. 
22 James Clifford 1986. 
23 Morgan 2016b, op. cit. 
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contestable ends of social justice, and especially so since the social sciences are 
performative in their effects.24 Admittedly, as Rodriguez  Medina correctly points out, 
these are somewhat grand pursuits, especially once foundationalism has been 
abandoned, much easier to give lip service to than consistently follow. They might 
also, however, be conceived as pragmatic orientation devices, and I am sure Medina 
would agree that the promise of sociology is better served by faltering towards 
valuable goals, than by consistently meeting less worthy ones.    
 
Contact details: mm2014@cam.ac.uk 
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